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SECURITY INFORMATION

C-O-P-Y

19 October 1951

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Administration and Logistics Staff

SUBJECT: OPC's Position with Respect to Rotation of Personnel between the Covert and Overt Offices in CIA Career Development Program

REFERENCES: a. Minutes of ADPC's Staff Meeting of 25 Sept 51 -- Para 1.e.  
b. Letter from ADPC to Director of Training, CIA, dtd 29 Aug 51 -- commenting on the CIA paper "A Program for the Establishment of a Career Corp in the Central Intelligence Agency."

1. OPC's position with respect to the rotation of personnel between the covert and overt offices as part of an Agency-wide career system was set forth initially by ADPC in his letter of 29 August 1951 to the Director of Training, CIA, in response to a request for analysis and comment on the "career corps" proposals submitted previously by CIA. The present memorandum restates and amplifies that position on the basis of detailed comments received from the various OPC Staff and Division Chiefs. The essentials of that position are as follows:

a. As a general principle OPC holds to the view that personnel should not as a regular procedure be rotated back and forth between the overt and covert offices. The main reasons for this view are that rotation from overt to covert offices and back again would present security hazards both for the organization and for the individuals. The need for anonymity of personnel, the principle of compartmentation and other safeguards against possible penetration would be threatened if the covert offices were subject to the continued introduction of temporary personnel. OPC would welcome receiving qualified personnel from the other offices and then training them for continued duty in covert operations. The major problem would arise in training them for, and acquainting them with, clandestine operations and subsequently returning them to completely different duties. This comment is not intended, in any way, to reflect on the

loyalty and security-mindedness of rotatees from other offices, but merely to emphasize the need for avoiding the danger inherent in more than the absolute minimum of persons "knowing too much."

b. Within the purview of this general principle OPC acknowledges that in the interests of the organization as a whole provisions should be made for exception in certain cases which can be shown to be of major benefit to the Agency and which do not violate the general principle set forth above. Examples of such exceptional cases might arise as follows:

(1) A specialist employed by an overt office or by CIA headquarters whose background and experience would be uniquely useful to the covert offices in developing or carrying out a program, project or special operation. In such a case, the services of this individual should be utilized to the fullest extent even though he will later be returned to the overt office.

(2) A covert office specialist whose experience and aptitude would make him uniquely useful to an overt office such as OSI, ONE, ORR, etc. In such cases, it should be possible to lend the specialist or transfer him permanently to an overt office in accordance with the specific need.

(3) An individual with a distinguished record in a covert office as an executive or as a staff specialist whose services could contribute to the benefit of the Agency by being utilized at CIA Hq. (This would permit desirable leeway for promoting top executives of this Agency, a flexibility which will have to be inherent in any "career system" adopted by the Agency, both in the interests of Agency efficiency and of incentives for the individual.)

2. The detailing or transferring of individuals in the manner described above may be accomplished without violating the general principle of compartmentation and other security safeguards. Such limited prescription while serving the overall needs of the Agency would at the same time avoid the danger of the continued introduction of temporary personnel into the covert offices.

/s/ 25X1A9a

Chief, Personnel and Training Division